Monday, July 4, 2011

Food For Thought: Individual versus Group

First, lets take care of business - Happy 4th of July!

Second, a little run down on my current thoughts on pay for performance. I'm focusing my policy brief on group versus individual performance pay for teachers.  Below are random thoughts on the two categories.  I'm going to use this space to organize my thinking before formal writing.  Since this is informal writing, I'm not worrying about individual citations.  However, I am offering my resources below.  These are the articles most germain to my research.  

As always, please offer any thoughts / suggestions you may have! 

Group performance pay, currently practiced in Florida (among other places), occurs when all professional stakeholders involved receive a bonus based on a specified performance action.  In Florida, schools receive a lump sum of money from the state (based per kid) if they raise the school grade from one year to the next.  The funds are distributed following proposal submissions from various stakeholders and a vote from school employees. 

For each instance I've encountered, the schools usually decide to have a tiered pay-out where various school roles receive a lump sum of money.  For instance, teachers may receive $1,000, paras and secretaries receive $750 and custodians receive $500.  This pay out is given regardless of individual performance.  Other common proposals include setting aside a portion for school and/or professional development (such as technology) and then following the tiered plan above for the remaining portion of money.  

This type of performance plan has little effect, however, on individual student performance.  Teachers who consider themselves effective feel taken advantage from those they consider to be coasting through the profession.  In addition, teachers see the performance pay as a "fluke" or "random" in nature and do not consider it a true representation of better teaching, only better students. 

This does, however, have some positive effects.  Schools who receive the performance pay often report an increase in teacher motivation and engagement.  In addition, schools who receive the performance pay often receive the payout for several years at a time which could indicate increased performance on measured items. 

Individual performance plans, recently or currently practiced in Denver, New York and Wisconsin (among others), have teachers and administrators work towards meeting individual benchmarks in order to receive a pay incentive.  These often include assuming additional leadership roles, attending professional development and increased student performance.  In most cases, each action is given a monetary value and teachers keep and submit a portfolio outlining their performance for review. 

This type of performance plan has had little effect on individual student performance.  Teachers who typically receive the bonus do so because of increased responsibilities, increased professional development and increased formal education.  Only a small percentage of teachers receive the increased pay for increased student performance.  Teachers often view this part of the performance plan as unobtainable and, instead, focus on the factors they see as easier to obtain. 

This type of plan does have some positive side effects.  Teachers tend to attend and implement more professional development ideas and often have advanced degrees from increased formal education.  However, the increased education is often in unrelated fields to current teaching assignments.  Teachers also report increased collaboration as they tend to spend more time together attending professional development where they form lasting professional relationships. 

Sources:

Ballou, D. (2001). Pay for performance in public and private schools. Economics of Education Review, 20(1), 51-61. doi: 10.1016/S0272-7757(99)00060 
Burden, P. R. (1987). Establishing career ladders in teaching: a guide for policy makers. Springfield, IL: Thomas.  


Cissell, G. (2010). Kentucky and education reform: the issue of pay-for-performance. Journal of Law & Education, 39(1), 119-127. 
Dee, T. S., & Keys, B. J. (2004). Does merit pay reward good teachers? Evidence from a randomized experiment. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23(3), 471-488. doi: 10.1002/pam.20022   
Denver Public School Professional Compensation for Teacher (Rep.). (n.d.). Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Denver Public Schools website: http://denverprocomp.dpsk12.org/ 
Figlio, D. N., & Kenny, L. W. (2007). Individual teacher incentives and student performance. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5-6), 901-914. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.001   
Fryer, R. G. (2011, March). Teacher incentives and student achievement: evidence from New York City public schools [Scholarly project]. In NBER Working Paper Series. Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://www.nber.org/tmp/92064-w16850.pdf 
Johns, E. (2009). Is it "merit pay" if nearly all teachers get it? Minneapolis Star Tribune 
Ladd, H. F. (1999). The Dallas school accountability and incentive program: An evaluation of its impacts on student outcomes. Economics of Education Review, 18, 1-16. doi: 10.1016/S0272-7757(97)00044-7 
Lavy, V. (2007). Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers. The Future of Children, 17(1), 87-109. doi: 10.1353/foc.2007.0007   
Podgursky, M. J., & Springer, M. G. (2007). Teacher performance pay: a review. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4), 909-950. doi: 10.1002/pam.20292 
Sorenson, B. (2007). Credentials versus performance: review of the teacher performance pay research. Peabody Journal of Education, 82(4), 551-573.  

Monday, June 20, 2011

What is Merit Pay

Merit pay can be categorized into (1) output, (2) input, (3) observation and (4) a combination of the three.  When using one of these forms, districts must choose between group rewards and individual rewards.  This is could be what determines success and buy-in from teachers.


Monday, June 13, 2011

Pay for Performance (of what?)

More teachers than not give additional non-paid hours, after school student support when needed and seek to improve their professional practice on a regular (or semi regular basis).  I wouldn't say this is an overwhelming majority in education but, like any professional field, you have a bottom few who do only what is needed to get by, the top few who often go far above and beyond what would ever be expected and the middle that typically conforms to leader expectations and a combination of theory X and theory Y management styles. 

However, in education, the prevailing thought seems to lay within a test score.  As in, this student test score will accurately portray all additional work (or lack there of) for any teacher.  Does it? 

Frederick M. Hess (this link is his blog, but the information below came from a published article cited below), once director of educational policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote an article where he offered a narrative of an elementary teacher in LA who holds class from 6:30am - 5:00pm, gives students books of all levels to read and holds them accountable for understanding them and provides a daily grammar quiz (which I'm not sure why Hess mentioned but it seemed important to the story but a little excessive in my view).   In addition, the teacher spends the summer vacation meeting with students individually for unnamed reasons.  Students in this class, according to Hess, often read in the 88th percentile compared to 42nd for the rest of the school that meets during normal school hours.

What do you think, wise and worldly readers?  Does this person deserve to make more than others?  And, more importantly, why do you think so?

More of my thoughts common soon...

(No worries Dr. D, it'll tie in to my topic. =))

Article Referenced:
Hess, F. M. (2004).  Teacher Quality, Teacher Pay.  Policy Review.  April and May issue. 

Monday, May 23, 2011

What I know, where I'm going

For this week's post, I prepared a vodcast.  Through the video you'll learn where I obtained the information I already know and where I plan to head in the future.



Below, you'll find my reading list.  If you know of any additional information that may prove useful, please be sure to send it my way!

Reading List
A, T. (2008). The missing link: estimating the impact of incentives on effort and effort on production using teacher accountability legislation [Scholarly project]. In Duke University Working Paper.

Aaronson, D., Barrow, L., & Sander, W. (2007). Teachers and student achievement in the Chicago public high schools. Journal of Labor Economics, 25(1), 95-135. doi: 10.1086/508733

Ballou, D. (2001). Pay for performance in public and private schools. Economics of Education Review, 20(1), 51-61. doi: 10.1016/S0272-7757(99)00060

Burden, P. R. (1987). Establishing career ladders in teaching: a guide for policy makers. Springfield, IL: Thomas.

Cissell, G. (2010). Kentucky and education reform: the issue of pay-for-performance. Journal of Law & Education, 39(1), 119-127.

Dee, T. S. (2004). Does merit pay reward good teachers? Evidence from a randomized experiment. Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ759285

Defraja, G., & Landeras, P. (2006). Could do better: the effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools. Journal of Public Economics, 90(1-2), 189-213. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.009

Denver Public School Professional Compentation for Teacher (Rep.). (n.d.). Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Denver Public Schools website: http://denverprocomp.dpsk12.org/

Figlio, D. N., & Kenny, L. W. (2007). Individual teacher incentives and student performance☆. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5-6), 901-914. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.001

Fisher, T. H., Fry, B. V., Loewe, K. L., & Wilson, G. W. (1985). Testing teachers for merit pay purposes in Florida. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 4(3), 10-12. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-3992.1985.tb00454.x

Fryer, R. G. (2011, March). Teacher incentives and student achievement: evidence from New York City public schools [Scholarly project]. In NBER Working Paper Series. Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://www.nber.org/papers/w16850

Glewwe, P., Ilias, N., & Kremer, M. (2003, April). Teacher incentives [Scholarly project]. In NBER Working Paper Series. Retrieved May 17, 2011.

Goldhaber, D., DeArmond, M., Player, D., & Choi, H. (2008). Why do so few public school districts use merit pay? Journal of Education Finance, 33(3), 262-289.

Goorian, B. (2000). Alternative teacher compensation. Eugene, OR: ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, University of Oregon.

Hanushek, E. A., & Lindseth, A. A. (2009). Schoolhouses, courthouses, and statehouses: solving the funding-achievement puzzle in America's public schools. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hess, F. M. (2004). Teacher quality, teacher pay. Policy Review, (124).

Johns, E. (2009). Is it "merit pay" if nearly all teachers get it? Minneapolis Star Tribune.

King, R. A., Swanson, A. D., & Sweetland, S. R. (2003). The Dallas school accountability and incentive program: An evaluation of its impacts on student outcomes. Economics of Education Review, 18, 1-16.

King, R. A., Swanson, A. D., Sweetland, S. R., & Swanson, A. D. (2003). School finance achieving high standards with equity and efficiency. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

King, R. A., Swanson, A. D., Sweetland, S. R., & Swanson, A. D. (2003). School finance achieving high standards with equity and efficiency. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Lavy, V. (2007). Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers. The Future of Children, 17(1), 87-109. doi: 10.1353/foc.2007.0007

Lavy, V. (2007). Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers. The Future of Children, 17(1), 87-109. doi: 10.1353/foc.2007.0007

MacPhail-Wilcox, B., & King, R. A. (n.d.). Personnel reforms in education: Intents, consequences, and fiscal implications. Journal of Education Finance, 14, 100-134.

Milanowski, A. (n.d.). The varieties of knowledge and skill-based pay design: A comparison of seven new pay systems for K-12 teachers (Rep.). Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Consortium for Policy Research in Education website: http://www.cpre.org/Publications/rr50.pdf

Milanowski, A. (2004). The Relationship Between Teacher Performance Evaluation Scores and Student Achievement: Evidence From Cincinnati. Peabody Journal of Education, 79(4), 33-53. doi: 10.1207/s15327930pje7904_3

Milanowski, A. (2007). Performance pay system preferences of students preparing to be teachers. Education Finance and Policy, 2(2), 111-132. doi: 10.1162/edfp.2007.2.2.111

Odden, A., & Kelley, C. (2002). Paying teachers for what they know and do: new and smarter compensation strategies to improve schools. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Odden, A., & Kelley, C. (2002). Paying teachers for what they know and do: new and smarter compensation strategies to improve schools. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Podgursky, M. J., & Springer, M. G. (2007). Teacher performance pay: a review. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4), 909-950. doi: 10.1002/pam.20292

Podgursky, M. J., & Springer, M. G. (2007). Teacher performance pay: a review. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4), 909-950. doi: 10.1002/pam.20292

Professional pay. (n.d.). Retrieved May 16, 2011, from http://www.nea.org/pay/teachermyths.html
Protsik, J. (1996). History of teacher pay and incentive reforms. Journal of School Leadership, 6(3), 265-289.

Rice, J. K. (2003). Teacher quality: understanding the effectiveness of teacher attributes. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.

Rosenholtz, S. J. (1987). Education reform strategies: will they increase teacher commitment? American Journal of Education, 95(4), 352-389. doi: 10.1086/444325

Sawchuk, S. (2010). Study casts cold water on bonus pay. Education Week, 30(5), 12-13.

Sojourner, A., West, K., & Mykerezi, E. (2011, April 19). When does teacher incentive pay raise student achievement?: evidence from Minnesota's q-comp program [Scholarly project]. In REPEC Working Papers. Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://repec.org/opt/redif/repec/hrr/papers/0111.pdf

Sorenson, B. (2007). Credentials versus performance: review of the teacher performance pay research. Peabody Journal of Education, 82(4), 551-573.

Stevens, L. P., & Piazza, P. (2010). Dear President Obama and Secretary Duncan: you are looking through the wrong window. Journal of Adolecent & Adult Literacy, 53(6), 512-515.

Storey, A. (2000). A leap of faith? Performance pay for teachers. Journal of Education Policy, 15(5), 509-523. doi: 10.1080/026809300750001667

What's a teacher worth? (2005). Education Next, 5(1), 60-3-65-7.

Woessmann, L. (n.d.). Cross-country evidence on teacher performance pay. Economics of Education Review, 30(3), 404-418.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Quest to become the 'Master of my Domain'

Teacher pay for performance recently became law in the State of Florida . This topic has been on the Florida legislative agenda since the late 1990s. Pay for performance, of course, is not a new idea but one borrowed from business models. It reached education a while ago and has taken many forms. The best example in the United States I'm currently aware of is the Denver Public Schools implementation of pay for performance, approved in 1999 by both the school board and teacher union and slowly implemented over the next decade. The system is still in use today.

Different types of pay for performance plans have developed for public schools. It can be as simple as tying test scores to pay scales or as complex as setting forth various objectives teachers must accomplish in order to increase their yearly salary with each action worth a specific dollar amount.

From the current Florida press coverage, a dichotomy seems to have developed. Teacher Unions cast pay for performance plans as trecherous to public education whereas legislators and business leaders see it as the necessary reform to improve the failing status quo. In the end, who's right?

To become a more informed participant in the debate, I plan to delve deep into the topic through current legislation, committee hearings and research articles that focus on what's been done, what's been adopted through Florida Senate Bill 736 (now Florida law), and how education stakeholders have reacted to the change. This blog will chronicle my findings, thoughts and reactions through linked articles, summaries, rants and raves with text and other forms of media over the course of the summer.

Feel free to comment and connect me to relevant information. Happy blogging...

Monday, May 9, 2011

2011 Florida Class Size Bill (SB2120)

From a voter initiative in 2002, Florida altered the state constitution and added a class size reduction amendment regulating class size to 18 for K - 3, 22 for 4 - 8, and 25 for grades 9 - 12. Schools were eased into the changes and afforded time to make the necessary adjustments based on the following timeline:
  • School years 2003 - 2006, school district averages were used to determine compliance.
  • School years 2006 - 2009, school wide averages were used (this was extended during the 2010 legislative session through 2009 - 2010 school year). 
  • Beginning in 2010 - 2011, schools were required to meet the mandate at the classroom level.

The cost to meet these requirements (based on Florida Department Education’s estimate) were $18.7 billion. In 2010, the legislature recommended an amendment to alter the current constitutional language in an effort to make the reform budget-friendly. This would have loosened the requirements to school wide averages as opposed to individual classrooms. Ultimately, this referendum received 55% of the vote, but failed to meet Florida’s 60% voter approval requirement.

During the 2011 legislative session, representatives modified the original language in order to provide school districts with increased flexibility in meeting the voter mandate. SB2120 removed the cap requirements for students enrolled in college credit courses among many others. In addition, districts will be granted permission to exceed the cap by 3 students per classroom when the district determines an emergency situation is present and the increase will not impede the learning environment of the students. Emergency situations, although, are not clearly defined nor is a timeline for action provided.

Many school and district administrators feel the 2011 bill affords increased flexibility in meeting the class size mandate and reduces the stress of facing significant financial penalties from the Department of Education. Opponents of the bill voiced concerns that legislators are out of touch with the citizenry and this is simply a way to circumvent a voter driven mandate. Since the modifications stand to affect only 304 classes (versus the original 849), some have argued this piece of legislation appears to be a way of circumventing voter intent. In addition, legislators have not yet provided sufficient funding needed to meet the remaining requirements leaving many school districts to question whether this legislation is feasible.